In 13] there is proposed an ElGamal-type cryptosystem based on non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders with trapdoor decryption. The trapdoor information is the factorization of the non-fundamental discriminant q = q 2 . The NICEcryptosystem (New Ideal Class Encryption) 19] is an e cient variant thereof, which features quadratic decryption time and hence is very well suited for applications in which a central server has to decrypt a large number of ciphertexts in a short time. In this work we will introduce an e cient batch decryption method for NICE, which allows to speed up the decryption by about 30% for a batch size of 100 messages.
Introduction
The utilization of imaginary quadratic class groups in cryptography is due to Buchmann and Williams 4] , who proposed a key agreement protocol analogue to 7] based on class groups of imaginary quadratic elds, i.e. the class group of the maximal order. Since the computation of discrete logarithms in the class group of the imaginary quadratic number eld is at least as di cult as factoring the corresponding discriminant (see 4, 21] ) these cryptosystems are very interesting from a theoretical point of view. In practice however these cryptosystems seemed to be less e cient than popular cryptosystems based on computing discrete logarithms in IF p , like 7, 9] or factoring integers, like 20] . Furthermore the computation of the group order, i.e. the class number, is in general almost as hard as computing discrete logarithms itself by application of the algorithm of Hafner / McCurley 10] or more practical variants like 8], which is subexponential with L 1 2 ]. Hence it seemed to be impossible to set up signature schemes analogue to 9, 18] or 20]. In 13] however it was shown how the application of non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders may be used to construct an ElGamal-type cryptosystem with fast decryption and that it is in principle possible to set up ElGamal and RSA-type signature schemes. In 19] there is proposed an ElGamal-type cryptosystem, later on called NICE for New Ideal Class Encryption, with very fast decryption. It was shown that the decryption process only needs quadratic time, which makes NICE unique in this sense. First implementations show that the time for decryption is comparable to the time for RSA-encryption with e = 2 16 .
The central idea of this scheme is to use an element of the kernel of the isomorphic map ' ?1 : I q (q) ! I (q) which maps O q -ideals which are prime to the conductor q to O -ideals which are also prime to q, to mask the message in the classical ElGamal cryptosystem. Hence this mask simply "disappears" during the trapdoor-decryption, which just consists of applying ' ?1 , reducing the resulting ideal in the maximal order (and possibly going back to the non-maximal order using '). The most time consuming step in the decryption is to compute the map ' ?1 , which is essentially the computation of a modular inverse (modulo q) using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, which needs O(log 2 (q)) bit operations. It is clear that because of this feature NICE is very well suited for applications where a central server has to decrypt a large number of ciphertexts in a short time. Thus it is natural to search for an e cient batch decryption method. In Section 4 we will introduce a simple yet e cient method for batch decryption, which speeds up the system in this scenario even further. The timings in Section 4 show that it is possible to speed up the decryption process for 100 messages by about 30%.
In 14] it is proposed to use totally non-maximal imaginary orders O pq , where pq = p 2 q 2 to set up RSA-type cryptosystems. Because one chooses such that h( ) = 1 it is easy to compute h( pq ) = (p ? ( =p))(q ? ( =q)). It is clear that a similar strategy may be used to set up DSA analogues based on totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders as well. First implementations show that these cryptosystems are far to ine cient to be used in practice 11]. In Section 5 however we will introduce an entirely new method for e cient exponentiation in totally non-maximal orders. Instead of using the standard ideal arithmetic (multiplication and reduction of ideals) in the non-maximal order we multiply and "reduce" the corresponding generators in the maximal order and later on lift the resulting principal ideal, which corresponds to the computed generator, to the non-maximal order. The timings in Section 5 show that the new exponentiation technique is about thirteen times as fast as classical ideal arithmetic. With this new arithmetic it is possible to implement DSA-variants based on totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders, which are "about as e cient" as conventional DSA for comparably secure parameters. Furthermore there still seems to be much space for further improvements. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we will provide the necessary basics on imaginary quadratic orders emphasizing the relation between the maximal order and (totally) non-maximal orders. In Section 3 we will brie y recall the NICE cryptosystem. In Section 4 we will introduce the new batch decryption for NICE and compare the running times of the implementation. The new exponentiation method for totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders is introduced in Section 5, where we also provide a timing comparison between the new method and the conventional ideal arithmetic. Our cryptosystems make use of the relation between the maximal and non-maximal orders.
Any non-maximal order may be represented as O f = ZZ + fO 1 . If h( ) = 1 then O f is called a totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic order of conductor f. An O -ideal a is called prime to f, if gcd(N(a); f) = 1. It is well known, that all O f -ideals prime to the conductor are invertible. In every class there is an ideal which is prime to any given number. The algorithm FindIdealPrimeTo in 13] will compute such an ideal. If we denote the (principal) O f -ideals, which are prime to f by P f (f) and I f (f) respectively then there is an isomorphism
Thus we may 'neglect' the ideals which are not prime to the conductor, if we are only interested in the class group Cl( f ). Thus for totally non-maximal orders it is easy to compute and control the class number. Hence it is easy to set up RSA-and DSA-analogues. In Section 5 we will return to this issue and propose a new exponentiation technique for these totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders. 
E cient batch decryption for NICE
It is clear that because of its very fast decryption NICE is very well suited for applications in which a central server has to decrypt a large number of ciphertexts in a short time. Thus it is desireable to have an e cient batch decryption procedure at hand. In the following we will introduce a simple method which decrypts n ciphertexts c i , 1 i n in one step, which turns out to be much faster than the sequential processing. If we have a closer look at the decryption procedure above we recognize that the most time consuming operation is the computation of GotoMaxOrder. This step is essentially the computation of a modular inverse modulo the conductor. Thus we can speed up the decryption process by applying a batch-gcd-strategy, like proposed Table 1 below. The implementation was done using the LiDIA-package 16] on a Pentium 133 MHz choosing random primes p; q of the respective bit-length. The timings are given in microseconds, averaged over a number of 100 randomly chosen messages. The rst row shows how many modular multiplications are as costly as one inversion in LiDIA. The next rows give the time for a NICE-encryption using 80bit exponents and the binary, usual BGMW-, and the signed BGMW-method 2] for exponentiation. This includes the time for the messageembedding. The last four rows give the decryption time (per message) for batch sizes of 1, 5, 10 and 100 messages respectively. This shows that for a batch size of 100 we are able to speed up the decryption by about 30%.
E cient Exponentiation for totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders
The rst implementations of DSA-and RSA-analogues based on totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders using a standard ideal arithmetic show that these analogues are orders of maginitude slower than the original systems using modular arithmetic 11]. It is clear that the most time consuming operations are the exponentiations in the class group. In the following we will introduce an entirely new method for exponentiation in the class group of a totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic order. We will assume that h( ) = 1 and f 2 ZZ >1 is the conductor in the following.
Instead of multiplying and reducing the ideals in the non-maximal order we will work with the generators which are corresponding to principal ideals in the maximal order. This strategy will turn out to be much more e cient. We will start with a simple lemma, which can easily be veri ed by straightforward calculation. The following lemma follows immediately from (4)- (7) and Lemma 11. 17 Lemma Let i = x i + y i ! 2 O , x i ; y i 2 ZZ; i 2 f1; 2g, ! like given in (1) and f 1. clear whether the fact that one uses non-maximal orders makes the discrete logarithm problem any easier. Therefore one may consider DL-based cryptosystems in (ZZ=pZZ) with 1024 bit p as secure as DL-based cryptosystems based on Cl( p ) with about 800 bit p and hence 400 bit p. In this case the timings show that the original DSA is "only" about 2.5 times as fast as the DSA-analogue based on totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders. Because there still seems to be much space for improvements one should have a closer look at these schemes.
